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unconscionable employer adopts the tactics suggested by the
Williamson fact situation.
An estoppel similar to that of the 1958 amendment" affect-
ing workmen's compensation insurers could be extended by
legislation to cover cases of uninsured employers who make
workmen's compensation payments of this nature. However,
because the amendment covers only the defense of nonhazardous
nature of employment, such estoppel might require extension
to several of the other more important defenses available to
employers. Such legislative measures would seem necessary
only in the face of a widespread use of this dodge of tort liability
by "erroneous" payments.
Janis M. Lasseigne
MINERAL LAW-LEASES-NECESSITY OF PUTTING IN DEFAULT
Plaintiff-lessor sued for cancellation of a mineral lease,
alleging shut-in royalties had not been paid.' Defendant-lessee
answered that by the terms of the lease the lessor was obliged
to give notice of breach before bringing action on the lease2
and that notice had not been given. Defendant also pleaded that
it owed no royalties on the lease. The district judge cancelled
33. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
1. Plaintiff also contended that production royalties had not been timely
paid, but neither the district judge nor the First Circuit relied on nonpay-
ment of production royalties in rendering their decisions. The shut-in roy-
alty clause, clause 3(d) in the lease, reads as follows:
"For any period or periods when, after thirty (30) days following dis-
covery of gas or distillate on the leased premises such product is not being
sold due to lack of a market and is not being used off the leased premises
or in the manufacture of gasoline or other product, and for that reason the
well or wells are shut-in, Lessee shall pay as advance royalty for the shut-in
well or wells an amount per well as set forth in paragrah 4(e) hereof and
pro rata for any lesser period. Said advance royalty shall be payable within
thirty days after the shutting-in of the well or wells. Under such circum-
stances, it will be considered that gas or distillate is being produced, but
such gas well cannot be shut-in for a period longer than two (2) consecutive
years."
Clause 4(e) of the lease states: "For the purpose of calculating shut-in
gas royalty payments, shut-in royalties shall be calculated at $50.00 per
acre per well per year (an arpent is deemed to be an acre)."
2. Clause 9 states: "In the event Lessor considers that Lessee has failed
to comply with one or more of its obligations hereunder, either expressed
or implied, Lessor shall notify Lessee in writing setting out specifically in
what respects Lessor claims Lessee has breached this lease. The service of
such notice and the lapse of thirty (30) days without Lessee's meeting or
commencing to meet the alleged breaches shall be a condition precedent to
such action by Lessor on this lease."
NOTES
the lease, holding that shut-in royalties had not been timely
paid. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed and held, where a
clause in an oil, gas, and mineral lease requires that lessor give
written notice of a supposed breach as a condition precedent
to bringing action, failure of the lessee to pay shut-in royalties
is not a ground for cancellation if notice of breach has not been
given. Bollinger v. Republic Petroleum Corp., 194 So.2d 139 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1966), writs denied, 196 So.2d 276 (1967).
Leases in common use in Louisiana and throughout the
country frequently contain notice and demand clauses similar
to that found in the instant case.8 To determine the intent of
the parties regarding the notice and demand clause, one must
look to the reasons for its insertion in the printed lease form,
for the parties in the instant case apparently did not themselves
draft the provision. Absent other evidence, the presumption
must be that the parties meant to use the clause in the manner
intended by those who drafted the form.
The notice and demand clause became necessary in stand-
ard lease forms to protect the lessee from arbitrary cancellation,
especially in states which had no law requiring notice and
demand or in which the applicable law was uncertain.4 There
is no reason to believe that this is not still the principal function
of the clause. But the Louisiana Civil Code provides rules ap-
plicable to notice and cancellation," and Louisiana courts have
often considered the necessity for a formal putting in default
in actions for cancellation of oil and gas leases." It would seem,
therefore, that in Louisiana the standard notice and demand
clause is not intended to abrogate or alter existing laws7 What,
3. See 4 IL WLLiAMS, Om & GAS LAW § 682.1 (1964).
4. 4 id. § 682, at 336: "Although there is a substantial body of law
requiring notice and demand as a prerequisite to forfeiture, some states
seem not to have the requirement and in others the nature of the require-
ment is unclear .... Therefore it has come to be the practice to include in
oil and gas leases an express provision that the lessee's interest shall not
be forfeited . . . by reason of breach of condition or covenant until a speci-
fied condition precedent has been satisfied. The condition precedent in many
leases is notice of breach and demand for performance followed by the pas-
sage of a period of time during which the lessee may commence the per-
formance of its obligations-a 'Notice and Demand Clause.'" See also Wil-
liams & Meyers, Forfeiture, Notice and Demand and Judicial Ascertainment
Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases, 1 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 41, 48 (1961).
5. See text at notes 8, 9 and 10 infra.
6. See text at note 11 infra.
7. If the notice and demand clause in the lease be more than an expres-
sion of the existing law in Louisiana, why does it not include the terminol-
ogy "active and passive" in describing the breaches to which it applies? As
this is the distinction made by the Louisiana Civil Code in determining the
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then, should be the interpretation and application of the notice
and demand clause in the Bollinger v. Republic lease?
The Louisiana Civil Code has distinguished between active
and passive breaches of contract-active breach involving "doing
something inconsistent with the obligation" and passive breach
being "not doing" something required by the contract.8 An active
breach of a contract requires no formal putting in default,9
while a passive breach requires such notice and demand. 10 A
line of jurisprudence has developed in Louisiana in recent years
which applies these provisions of the Code to actions for can-
cellation of oil and gas leases for failure to pay production
royalties.
Melancon v. Texas Co." was the first case in this series. The
Texas Company, lessee, had delayed payment of production
royalties for a period of fifteen months, this delay being an
obvious attempt to force Melancon, lessor, into a revision of
the lease.12 Likening lessee's actions to a refusal to pay, the
Supreme Court stated that "a delay of fifteen months for no valid
reason is unjustifiable' ' 5- and is an active violation of the con-
tract. Cancellation was allowed. Thus, Melancon established that
a bad faith failure to carry out the lease provisions dealing
with payment of production royalty for a substantial period of
time constituted an active breach.
Two subsequent cases extended the Melancon decision.
Bailey v. Meadows14 and Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co.'5 in-
volved lessors seeking cancellation of mineral leases because
of nonpayment of production royalties, and in both cases can-
cellation was allowed without a prior formal putting in default.
Both decisions relied, heavily on Melancon in holding that the
need for default (notes 8, 9 and 10 infra), it would seem that such terminol-
ogy would be necessary to indicate an express intent to abrogate the exist-
ing Louisiana law and substitute the law of the contract.
8. LA. CIvIL CODE: art. 1931 (1870).
9. Id. art. 1932.
10. Id. art. 1933.
11. 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956).
12. Id. at 622, 89 So.2d at 145: "We think that a fair preponderance of
the evidence establishes that the trial judge was justified in his finding
' . . . that the defendant declined the payment of production royalties until
such time as the plaintiff entered into an agreement to enlarge the previ-
ously established production unit . . . ,' and that such non-payment was a
studied and deliberate means to coerce the plaintiff to accede to the pro-
posal for revision of the lease and an enlarged production unit."
13. Id. at 615, 89 So.2d at 142.
14. 130 So.2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
15. 140 So.2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
NOTES
delays in payment of production royalty were unjustifiable and
constituted active breaches of contract. But these cases differed
from Melancon in that there had been no showing of bad faith
on the part of the lessees; consequently, the concept of active
breach was broadened to include royalty nonpayment for a sub-
stantial period of time without justification. After Bailey and
Pierce, the lessor had only to show that the lessee had delayed
production royalty payments for a substantial period of time,
and if the lessee could not show that this delay was justifiable,
the nonpayment would constitute an active breach of the lease
contract requiring no formal putting in default. Disregarding
the question of whether this was the most advantageous inter-
pretation of the Code's articles on breach of contract and de-
fault,16 this line of reasoning has been consistently applied in
cases subsequent to Bailey and Pierce.7
Bollinger v. Republic is not a suit for cancellation based
on the nonpayment of production royalties as are the cases
mentioned above. It is a suit for cancellation based on the failure
of lessee to make shut-in payments. Should the same rules that
govern lease cancellation for nonpayment of production royalties
apply to failure to make shut-in payments? The answer would
apparently depend upon the wording of the shut-in payment
clause of the lease. Most lease forms attempt to characterize the
shut-in payment either as signifying constructive production-
a royalty payment, or as a delay rental payment.' A reading
of the Bollinger shut-in clause indicates that the shut-in pay-
ment is one for constructive production and is, thus, a royalty
payment.' The shut-in clause is found in the royalty clause of
the lease; it specifically designates the payments as being "royal-
ty"; it does not make them payable as rentals. These same
criteria, though found in a different lease form, 0 were sufficient
16. For a more complete discussion, see Smith, The Cloudy Concept of
Default, in TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 3 (1965).
17. See Fontenot v. Sunray Mid Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1967); Harris v. J. C. Trahan, Drilling Contractor, Inc., 168
So.2d 881 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So.2d
435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Fawvor v. United States Oil of La., Inc., 162
So.2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Comment, Cancellation of a Mineral Leasefor Nonpayment of Royalty: The Necessity for a Prior Putting in Default,
39 TUL. L. REV. 524 (1965).
18. See 3 H. WILIAMS, OIL & GAS LAW § 632.9 (1964).
19. See note 1 supra.
20. Paragraph 3 of the lease stated: "3. The royalties to be paid by lessee
are:
"(c) Where gas from a well producing gas only is not sold or used
because of no market or demand therefor, lessee may pay as royalty $50.00
19681
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in Davis v. Laster2 1 to indicate that the payment was to be con-
sidered as royalty. It follows that if the payments are identifi-
able as royalty for purposes of contract administration, the
same body of law which applies to production royalty payments
may well apply to the payment of shut-in royalty?22
In Bollinger v. Republic, the First Circuit deemed the
Bailey-Pierce line of jurisprudence inapplicable because specific
notice clauses were not in contention in those cases.2 3 The de-
cision allows the presence of a notice and demand clause in the
Bollinger lease to render inapplicable the Bailey-Pierce deci-
sions, the same jurisprudence which it seems the clause should
embrace. It is suggested that the court has avoided the actual
issue in this case. Treating the notice and demand clause in the
Bollinger lease as a provision merely expressive of the existing
law relating to breach of contract would have allowed the First
Circuit to make a determination of whether the delay in pay-
ment of shut-in royalties constituted an active or a passive
breach, and, consequently, whether a formal putting in default
was necessary before cancellation.24 However, instead of follow-
ing the recently developed Bailey-Pierce line of jurisprudence,
the First Circuit has chosen to embark on a new course, unneces-
sarily complicating an area of the law which had achieved rela-
tive stability.
J. C. Johnson
per well, per year, payable quarterly and upon such payment it will be con-
sidered that gas is being produced within the meaning of Article 2 of this
contract."
21. 242 La. 735, 138 So.2d 558 (1962).
22. See Comment, Shut-in Gas Well Payment-Royalty or Rental, 24
LA. L. REV. 384 (1964).
23. 194 So.2d at 143.
24. The shut-in royalty clause in the Bollinger lease provides that pay-
ment is to be "within thirty days after the shutting-in of the well or wells."
If the First Circuit had taken into consideration the justification for lessee's
delay in payment, this could have been an important factor in deciding the
amount of time which would constitute an unjustifiable delay. The ordinary
production royalty clause contains no provision for time of payment.
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